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Originality, joint authorship and databases
post-IceTV
William van Caenegem1 BOND UNIVERSITY
Copyright in compilations produced by corporate
employees is now more difficult to obtain.
Introduction
In IceTV the High Court effectively substituted the
“intellectual activity” test for the old “sweat of the
brow” approach to originality, abandoning the “industri-
ous collection” test for compilation copyright.2 The
Court also recast the requirements for subsistence of
copyright in a work of joint authorship.
It will take some time for the decision’s implications
for the full range of copyright materials to become
apparent. For instance, the courts have yet to consider in
depth its effect on copyright subsistence in design
drawings and articles.3
But its impact in the area of databases and computer
generated material has already been felt. Some years
prior to IceTV, the Full Court in Desktop Marketing had
held that copyright subsists in white pages of a tele-
phone directory.4However, post-IceTV the Federal Court
reversed that finding in Phone Directories.5
Take away tips for lawyers
• Before IceTV the sweat of the brow/industrious
collection approach to originality in copyright
predominated in Australia.
• But in IceTV the High Court confirmed that
copyright is an author’s right and not an investor’s
right.6
• Since IceTV the intellectual activity test is applied.
The particular work in which copyright is claimed
must reflect some intellectual activity of an indi-
vidual author.
• This change has made it more difficult for compa-
nies to rely on copyright in the broad realm of
database protection.7
• The post-IceTV approach to works of joint author-
ship has also made it difficult to obtain copyright
where employees have separately contributed to
producing material, rather than closely collaborat-
ing on creating a particular work.
• For these reasons there have been calls to intro-
duce statutory rights in non-original databases,
perhaps along European lines. It is worth noting,
however, that that system has received very mixed
reviews.
Phone Directories
The trial Court applied the higher IceTV standard of
originality.8 Effort and investment in collecting data, or
setting up and operating a computer system that pro-
duces a directory on command was not sufficient in
itself. Proof was required that human intellectual activity
was involved in creating the particular directory in
which copyright was claimed to subsist. The Full Court
confirmed that where a computer system generates the
final product from stored data without further human
intervention, the requisite authorial intellectual activity
in expressing the work in a particular form is absent.
Keane CJ in his judgment also agreed with the trial
judge concerning joint authorship, saying that the con-
tributions made by various individuals were precursors
to, rather than the actual making of the compilation
itself. Although the work of these individuals was
organized to facilitate production of the directory, it did
not amount to collaboration in the statutory sense, as the
contribution of each was made quite separately.9 The
implications for databases are considerable, since they
are commonly made by numerous employees fulfilling
distinct and separate tasks.
The statutory definition of a work of joint authorship
is “a work that has been produced by the collaboration of
two or more authors and in which the contribution of
each author is not separate from the contribution of the
other author or the contributions of the other authors”.10
Jonathan Parker LJ in the Court of Appeal of England
and Wales defined collaboration as “joint labouring in
furtherance of a common design”.11 Considering Olym-
pic Amusements,12 where copyright was held to subsist
in prize scales, Bennett J in Fairfax dismissed any
suggestion that there may be joint authorship even
though contributions are separate. Her Honour stressed
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that the Full Court had found that the prize scales
resulted from the “joint efforts” of the mathematicians
and employees involved. Milwell was not authority “for
the proposition that there can be joint authorship when
the contributions of the joint authors are separate and
distinct and not the result of collaboration.”13
Acohs
Thus there will be no copyright unless the creators
engage in combined intellectual activity to create a
particular work. Performing separate preparatory tasks
in accordance with an organized plan ultimately to
produce a work is not collaboration. The effect of this
approach is quite restrictive and is further illustrated by
Acohs.14 In this case Jessup J dismissed the idea that
those who wrote the program code and the authors and
transcribers who used it to produce a particular Materi-
als Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for a client firm were
joint authors.
Acohs’ counsel pressed the point that: “a work of
joint authorship might well be created by two or more
people, each of whom contributed a particular compo-
nent of the ultimate work, and none of whom need have
any appreciation — or even awareness — of the detailed
contributions of his or her fellows.”15 However, his
Honour considered it too artificial to say that the
programmers collaborated with the authors/transcribers
in the writing of the material Ucorp was said to have
copied. They made their contributions quite separately.
Once they had written the source code which could be
used to generate a particular MSDS, they made no
further contribution to its particular form and content:
“In no realistic sense did the programmers collaborate
with every author and transcriber whose efforts directly
led to the creation or transcription of an MSDS”.16 The
authors also did not know or understand anything of
what the programmers did to produce the operative
source code.
Tonnex
Contrast Acohs with Tonnex, where although all the
contents derived from the claimant’s database, the fact
that an identified human author could be shown to have
compiled it in a particular form in which copyright was
claimed meant that copyright was found to subsist.17
Dynamic collected information concerning all the prod-
ucts it supplied (mostly consumables for use in printers
of various brands) in a database or computer system
known as the “Navision system”. For each product this
system maintained an “item card” which contained
fields of information concerning each product, continu-
ously updated and maintained. The information for each
data card had to be entered manually rather than pasted
in, and was sourced from many sources including
manufacturers but also by Google searching for the
required data.
Dynamic then conceived of the idea of having “search-
able compatibility information in a simple form” on its
website.18 A named employee, Mr Campbell created a
compatibility chart, which had columns with particular
information fields concerning such aspects as product
code; manufacturer; product description; printer model
etc. Awebsite visitor could search this table, for instance
by manufacturer (brand) so that information “would be
filtered to produce only results for the selected [manu-
facturer]”.19 Mr Campbell decided which information
from the Navision database would be excluded from or
included in the chart, ie the information that he consid-
ered core to customer needs.
This chart was uploaded to the Dynamic website as a
CSV file representing nine columns containing certain
information (vendor code, vendor information, product,
product models etc respectively). A CSV file is a simple
text format in which each value is separated by a
comma; in effect it represents a rough presentation of
information which can then be “accessed in its entirety
or searched to obtain specific information within the
file”.20
The critical distinction between Tonnex and Acohs is
that the information was expressed by Mr Campbell in a
complete and fixed table which was stored as such, even
though in a relatively rough form. That the table could
be retrieved and presented in a more user-friendly
format, for instance by the application of the Microsoft
Excel program, did not detract from the fact that it
existed as such. In fact Mr Campbell saved the text file
as an Excel file and as a CSV file before uploading the
particular CSV file to the Dynamic website.21
The information in the CSV file came from a single
source, the Navision database, but according to the
Court “sufficient skill and judgment — intellectual effort
— was brought to bear by Mr Campbell in making the
selections he did”.22 The information in the CSV file
was “a collection of information brought together in a
particular convenient arrangement […] that was designed
to facilitate the searching and cross-referencing of infor-
mation relating to a particular universe of products
(namely, printer and computer consumable supplied by
Dynamic)”.23
Concluding in Ladbroke terms, the court said that
“Whilst negligible skill and labour will not suffice to
sustain a claim of originality, I am satisfied in the present
case that, cumulatively, the skill and labour employed by
Mr Campbell in creating the compatibility chart in the
form of the March 2008 CSV file was more than
negligible and that that work was, accordingly, an
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original literary work for copyright purposes”.24 The
court also pointed out that there was “nothing in the
product descriptions or compatibility information that
required that information to be expressed in the particu-
lar form in which it was expressed […]. Fact and
expression were not coextensive”.25 This distinguished
this case also from IceTV where the program time and
title information “given the context in which [it] was to
be expressed” could only be expressed in a limited form
— fact and expression were co-extensive.26
Thus Mr Campbell had made sufficient intellectual
judgments, choices and selections to give rise to an
original work, even though all his source material came
from the single database source (the Navision system).
The CSV file was the relevant work, it was in a fixed
pre-existing form which resulted from human intellec-
tual activity.
In terms of the question of joint authorship Tonnex
was distinguishable from Phone Directories. The Court
found on the facts that although some other named
employees were involved with inputting material into
the underlying Navision database, Mr Campbell was the
sole author of the compatibility chart. The creation of
the underlying database was rather analogous to what
happened in Phone Directories, as this quote illustrates:
“Insofar as the changes to the database were concerned,
each person making a change was carrying out his or her
own separate work in that regard, albeit sometimes in
accordance with conventions he or she was instructed to
observe, against the background knowledge that some of
this information would likely be used in the compatibil-
ity chart that Mr Campbell was compiling. But none was
an author of the compatibility chart or, more specifically,
of the March 2008 CSV file, which was created solely
by Mr Campbell”.27
In the final analysis Tonnex was thus not a case of
anonymous backroom workers inputting material into a
computer system which then upon command disgorged
a document without any further intellectual activity from
a human author. Rather, an identified person selected
and used information from a database to author a
particular literary work which was stored as such, and
could then be accessed and read by means of a computer
program. The chart as a CSV file could also be “read”
without being transmogrified by a computer program
such as Excel. Tonnex illustrates the importance of a
careful choice of the material in which copyright is
claimed to vest.
The separate contribution approach
The point made in Phone Directories that no joint
copyright vests where a number of people have sepa-
rately made or added a contribution is also illustrated by
Primary Healthcare.28 In this case patient notes devel-
oped over time by consecutive GP’s adding clinical
information to an initial document did not amount to a
work of joint authorship, and thus no copyright vested at
all in something that in other respects was a literary
work.
This illustrates an unusual result of the present
approach concerning works of joint authorship: where
one person expresses information in documentary form
(the initial GP’s notes), there may well be, in the result,
a literary work in which copyright subsists; but if others
add to that work separately at a later time, the thus
transformed work may fail to attract copyright at all,
because since there is no collaboration and only separate
contributions, no work of joint authorship results!
Naturally that is only the case if the later contribution
is of authorial quality. Take the example of what is
sometimes referred to as a collective novel: one author
writes the first chapter, another quite independently the
next and so on. On the present approach the result would
arguably not benefit from copyright, since it would have
to be considered as a work of joint authorship, but each
chapter represents a separate contribution. Each indi-
vidual chapter would attract copyright vesting in its own
author, but the end result, although a seamless work,
would not.
A further difficulty is caused by the differential
quality of contributions. If the contributions have the
quality of authorship, ie result from sufficient intellec-
tual activity, there may be joint-authorship. However, if
the contribution is made separately, this will then mean
there is no copyright since no work of joint authorship
can result from separate contributions.
So, for instance, if two contributions reach the
standard of authorship, but are separately made, copy-
right will not vest. But on the other hand, if only one of
the separate contributions reaches the standard of author-
ship, and all the rest are too minor or technical, then
there is no problem and copyright will subsist in the
totality!
An alternative approach?
An alternative approach is to examine the claimed
copyright work itself and ask whether the part of a joint
work emanating from a particular author can be identi-
fied and functionally separated from the rest. A distinc-
tion which implicitly recognizes this approach is often
made in the textbooks between works of joint authorship
and collective works, such as for instance an opera or
song.29 In the latter the reason that there is no work of
joint authorship is that the lyrics and the score are
separable and independent works.
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As to this view it is interesting to note what was said
by the lower court in Beckingham,30 an English musical
copyright case: “Finally there is the negative require-
ment: non-separateness. A work will not be a work of
joint authorship if the contribution of the co-authors is
separate. The example often given is a literary work
where separate authors contribute specific chapters, but
there are other examples where the distinction made in
the section may not be so easy to apply. I do not believe
that a contribution to the arrangement of a song of the
kind I am concerned with in this case is “separate” in the
sense in which that word is used in the section. The
added part is heavily dependent on what is there already.
Stripped of the voices and other instruments, the violin
part would sound odd, and lose meaning. The final
musical expression — what the audience will hear — is
a joint one”.
The Court here asks not whether contributions to the
song were made separately, but whether the contribution
of the particular putative co-author appears as something
separate or separable in the final work. Hence the
Court’s point that the final work appears as a seamless
whole and that if the part of the co-author were
subtracted nothing sensible or communicative would
remain. This seems a more sensible and less restrictive
test.
On a final note, the present approach seems to result
in a distinct overlap between the requirements of col-
laboration and non-separateness of contribution. What
now is the real difference between saying: you must
have really collaborated; and “you must not have worked
separately”?
Fairfax and hyperlinks
Fairfax v Reed further compounds the bad case of the
copyright blues of database owners or compilers.31 The
court had to consider whether copyright subsisted in
individual titles of articles published in The Australian
Financial Review. They had been reproduced by the
defendant’s compilation and abstraction service. The
Court found that the authors of the body or text of each
article (journalists) did not produce works of joint
authorship with those who separately devised the titles
(sub-editors). They did not collaborate: rather, the jour-
nalist wrote the text and then quite separately and
independently, sub-editors devised a suitable title, in
accordance with their own particular parameters.
Nor were the titles taken by themselves copyright
works because they were too small (insubstantial) and
insufficient proof of skill and effort in their production
could be provided, according to the court. This was in
line with the earlier decision in Pacific Technologies
where the phrase “Help-Help-Driver-in-Danger-Call-
Police-Ph.000” was held to lack sufficient originality to
attract copyright.32
Applying the intellectual activity test
But did the approach taken in Reed properly accord
with the intellectual activity-test which IceTV now
prescribes? Surely if a title is witty, smart and not
commonplace, this evidences intellectual activity on the
author’s part: don’t we value exactly that in popular
authors? Going back to the pre-IceTV “sufficient effort”
focus and language is arguably not appropriate: the High
Court has made it quite clear that copyright is not about
protecting effort and investment, but intellectual activity
of an authorial kind.33
Given that, if the Reed approach is correct, it is
unlikely that had the journalist written article and title,
copying only the latter would amount to reproduction of
a substantial part (one reflecting a sufficient level of
“originality” ie intellectual activity), it appears that there
is little that can be done to stop competitors using titles
of others’ works as hyperlinks, whether to that material
or some other material. This would have to be attacked,
if at all, on some other basis than copyright, for instance
by recourse to the Trade Practices Act/Consumer Law,
as was done in the battle between Luxottica/Budget
Eyewear and Specsavers in 2010.34
OPSM and Specsavers
However, in that matter copyright was also pleaded,
as one party accused the other of the infringing repro-
duction of some advertising phrases or slogans.35
Budget Eyewear initiated an advertising campaign
(print and radio) in which it offered to replace broken
glasses originating from its competitor OPSM with a
replacement Specsavers sourced pair for free under
certain conditions.
OPSM retaliated by making the same offer in very
similar terms that it admitted sourcing from the Specsav-
ers ads. The critical part of the ads consisted of about 5
phrases conveying the idea of bringing in a pair of the
competitor’s glasses for a free replacement and thus
coming to the rescue of the shopper. Were these simple
phrases “designed to express a simple series of con-
cepts”; were they a string of “four ordinary and com-
monplace sentences”; or had “a degree of care and skill
[…] been exercised in order to convey simple ideas
effectively in an advertisement [where] various means
could have been taken to express the concept”?36
Commonplacewordsandconsideredphrases
The Court considered that the fact that the words
were commonplace did not matter — what counted was
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whether the words and phrases were chosen carefully
and “put together in a particular considered way”.37
Elsewhere, in the context of infringement the Court
points out that “various means could have been used to
express the concept”.38 The arrangement of words
chosen by the applicant was not “obvious and pro-
saic”.39 In adopting this approach Budget Eyewear is
more in line with the reasoning in IceTV, and casts a
different light on Reed: arguably the witty titles which
were denied copyright there were also “chosen carefully
and put together in a particularly considered way”!
Specsavers was not concerned with a single simple
phrase, but with a number of them. It does beg the
question as to where the line is to be drawn: no to one
phrase even if witty and eye-catching (Reed) but yes to
4 phrases, which were arguably a rather prosaic expres-
sion of something which might well have been a rather
cunning underlying marketing ploy. For purposes of
comparison it is worth considering the permissive approach
adopted by the European Court of Justice in Infopaq.40
In New Zealand as well, a court has accepted copyright
in a short sentence:41 “Field Friendly — the best choice
for fieldwork”.
William van Caenegem,
Professor of Law,
Bond University Faculty of Law,
Author of Intellectual and Industrial Property in Austra-
lia, LexisNexis (2009)
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